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Enhancing Rescue in Chapter 11:
Lessons from Reform Efforts in the United Kingdom

Abstract: This is a dynamic time for insolvency law. Many jurisdictions have or
are considering reforms to their insolvency regimes. The U.K. has proposed a
new standalone restructuring mechanism that incorporates many attributes of
Chapter 11, including a cross-class cram down and the absolute priority rule. A
distinctive feature of the U.K proposal is the infusion of judicial discretion
permitting courts to deviate from the absolute priority rule. This discretion is not
permitted in the U.S. This judicial discretion addresses a key problem with the
application of the absolute priority rule in the U.S. – it serves as an impediment to
reorganization. This impediment is exacerbated by the recent U.S. Supreme
Court decision, Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., which impacts the effective use
of Chapter 11 rescue tools. This article explores the absolute priority rule, the
problems associated with it and the effect of Jevic in the U.S. The case is made
that the strict application of the absolute priority rule in the U.S. is antiquated and
drawing on the U.K. reform proposal the author argues that the U.S. should
implement reforms that infuse judicial discretion into the application of the
absolute priority rule. Doing so will facilitate the underlying the policy goal of
rescuing the company in Chapter 11, but also promote a broader policy goal of
rescuing the business.

I.

Introduction

We are in a dynamic time for insolvency law and proposed reforms thereto.1 Many
jurisdictions, such a Spain and the Netherlands, as well as the European Commission,2 are
considering reforms to their restructuring regimes that are influenced at least in part by the U.K.’s
scheme of arrangement and Chapter 113 in the U.S.4 Other jurisdictions, such as Singapore, have

1

See Sarah Paterson, Market Organisations and Institutions in America and England: Valuation in Corporate
Bankruptcy, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 801, 802 (2018) (noting the reform activity in the U.K., European Commission
and the U.S.) [hereafter Paterson, Market]. See also Bob Wessels & Stephan Madaus, Business Rescue in
Insolvency Law in Europe: Introducing the ELI Business Rescue Report, 27 INT. INSOLV. REV. 255, 255 (2018)
(“Since the global financial crisis, insolvency and restricting law have been at the forefront of law reform initiatives
in Europe and elsewhere.”).
2
See Council of the European Union, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
preventive restructuring frameworks, second chance and measures designed to increase the efficiency of
restructuring, insolvency and discharge procedures and amending Directive 2012/30/EU- General Approach,
12536/18, October 1, 2018, available at http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12536-2018-INIT/en/pdf
(last accessed February 26, 2019).
3
Chapter 11 as used throughout this article refers to 11 U.S.C. § 1101 – 1174 of the U.S. Code.
4
Jennifer Payne, The Continuing Importance of the Scheme of Arrangement as a Debt Restructuring Tool, 15 EUR.
CO. FIN. L. REV. 445, 445-46 (2018) [hereafter Payne, Continuing].
1

already implemented significant reforms to its restructuring regime.5 The U.K.6 and the U.S.7 have
both engaged in a review of their restructuring regimes.8 The U.S. review has not gained much
legislative traction;9 however, the U.K. review has resulted in a reform proposal that will add a
new standalone restructuring mechanism to the restructuring options currently available.10
The proposed standalone restructuring mechanism includes a cross-class cram down,11 as
well as a statutory moratorium, both of which are not available in a single restructuring option in
English law.12 These features are generally viewed as positive attributes of a restructuring
regime.13 The Chapter 11 statutory framework includes both features14 and has influenced the
U.K. proposed reform.15 However, the U.K. has not blindly replicated Chapter 11. Notably, the
proposed cross-class cram down includes the absolute priority rule (APR), the primary focus of
this paper, but adds flexibility, not available in Chapter 11, for courts in the U.K. to deviate from
the APR in very limited circumstances.16 Such flexibility addresses a key criticism of a rigid
application of the APR in Chapter 11 - it can act as an impediment to reorganization of a
company,17 the traditional policy objective of Chapter 11.18 Moreover, a rigid application of the
APR also impedes the rescue of a business, a broader conceptualization of the fundamental goal
of insolvency law beyond the reorganization or rescue of a company.19
Just as the U.K. has drawn upon positive attributes of Chapter 11 in formulating their
reform proposal, the U.S. should look to the U.K. reform proposal for guidance on how to improve
applying the APR in Chapter 11. The need to reform the APR in the U.S. is not new as problems

5

See Meng Seng Wee, The Singapore Story of Injecting US Chapter 11 into the Commonwealth Scheme, 15 EUR.
CO. FIN. L. REV. 553-584 (2018) (providing overview of the reforms in Singapore).
6
See infra notes 248-276 and accompany text.
7
The U.S. review by the American Bankruptcy Institute (ABI) was completed in 2014 with the issuance of a very
detailed report. See AM. BANKR. INST. COMM’N TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11, 2012-2014 FINAL REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2014) [hereafter ABI REPORT].
8
Payne, Continuing, supra note 4, at 446.
9
See, e.g., Peter C. Blain, Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code: As It Was, As It Is, and As It May Be, ASPATORE,
2016 WL 676460, *16 (January 2016) (prospect of the ABI proposals becoming law is unclear).
10
Jennifer Payne, Debt Restructuring in the UK, 15 EUR. CO. FIN. L. REV. 449, 459 (2018) [hereafter Payne,
Restructuring].
11
“Cram down” is a phase used in bankruptcy parlance referring to a court’s authority to “cram” an “opposed plan
down upon a creditor in a nonconsenting class.” In re Lett, 632 R.3d 1216, 1228 (11th Cir. 2011).
12
Id. (both aspects are available with the twinning a scheme with administration).
13
See, e.g., Sarah Paterson, Reflections of English Law Schemes of Arrangement in Distress and Proposals for
Reform, 15 EUR. CO. FIN. L. REV. 472, 473, 478-88 (2018) (analyzing why a moratorium and cross-class cram down
may be beneficial to the UK restructuring regime) [hereafter Paterson, Reflections].
14
See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (automatic stay) and § 1129(b) (cram down).
15
Howard Morris, Not Chapter 11 but Chapter 11sh, RECOVERY 32, 33 (Spring 2017) (acknowledging the influence
of Chapter 11 on the U.K. proposal). See also Tim Verdoes & Anthon Verweij, The (Implicit) Dogmas of Business
Rescue Culture, 27 INT. INSOLV. REV. 398,400 (2018) (noting the influence of Chapter 11 on recent reform
proposals throughout Europe).
16
See infra notes 267-268 and accompanying text.
17
See infra notes 122-126, 264-266 and accompanying text.
18
See ABI REPORT, supra note 7, at 10 (discussing purpose of Chapter 11). See also Sarah Paterson, Rethinking
Corporate Bankruptcy Theory in the Twenty-First Century, 36 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 697, 699-700 (2016)
(summarizing policy orientation of Chapter 11) [hereafter Paterson, Rethinking]; Jennifer Payne, Debt
Restructuring in English Law: Lessons from the United States and the Need for Reform, 130 LAW Q. REV. 282, 299
(2014) (noting the reorganization policy of Chapter 11) [hereafter, Payne, Lessons].
19
Unless otherwise indicated, “rescue” as used in this article encompasses both rescue of a company and rescue of a
business. This broader conceptualization of rescue policy is explored in Part II.
2

associated with the APR are well documented.20 However, in light of the recent U.S. Supreme
Court decision, Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp.,21 the necessity for reform is more acute now
than at any time since the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code22 in 1978.23 Although, the APR is
well entrenched in U.S. bankruptcy law in the context of confirming of a Chapter 11 plan,24 Jevic
crystalized the application of the APR in a non-Chapter 11 confirmation of plan context – a
structured dismissal.25
Such a ruling by the Supreme Court appears positive. It arguably enhances protection the
APR provides for minority interests in Chapter 11,26 which may serve to diminish the surge of
secured creditor power in recent years27 and return power to the debtor, which is consistent with
the traditional policy of Chapter 11.28 However, Jevic may impede the effective use of Chapter 11
rescue tools including settlements,29 § 36330 sales and first-day orders.31 This cascading effect of
Jevic may frustrate Chapter 11s ability to foster rescue. To counter this effect U.S. policymakers
should consider the U.K. proposed reform that adds discretion for courts to deviate from the APR.

20

See infra notes 123-126.
Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017).
22
All references to Bankruptcy Code or Code are to Title 11 of the U.S. Code.
23
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2539 (1978).
24
See Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 983-84 (recognizing the importance of the priority structure
and inability to violate the priority structure without consent in the context of a Chapter 11 plan). See also Douglas
G. Baird & Donald S. Bernstein, Absolute Priority, Valuation Uncertainty, and the Reorganization Bargain, 115
YALE L.J. 1930, 1932 (2006) (APR “has been the foundation of our corporate reorganization laws for decades”).
25
Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 983. The structured dismissal is not provided for in the Code, but
is a construct of various aspects of bankruptcy law resulting in an order that combines aspects of a typical
confirmation order with a dismissal order in Chapter 11. See id. at 979. The ABI characterizes the structured
dismissal as a “hybrid dismissal and confirmation order . . . that . . . typically dismisses the case while, among other
things, approving certain distributions to creditors, granting certain third-party releases, enjoining certain conduct by
creditors, and not necessarily vacating orders or unwinding transactions undertaken during the case.” ABI REPORT,
supra note 7, at 270. For an overview of the structured dismissal, see generally Kaylyn Webb, Comment, Utilizing
the Fourth Option: Examining the Permissibility of Structured Dismissals that do not Deviate from the Bankruptcy
Code’s Priority Scheme, 33 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 355, 372-379 (2018) (detaining the legal authority for the
structured dismissal and appropriate use thereof); Norman L. Pernick & G. David Dean, Structured Chapter 11
Dismissals: A Viable and Growing Alternative after Sales, 29 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1 (2010) (overview of structured
dismissals).
26
See infra notes 118-121 and accompanying text (discussing minority protection the APR affords generally).
27
See David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditor’s Ball: The “New” New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. PENN. L.
REV. 917, 918-928 (discussing shift from manager orientation to the “creditor-oriented cast”). For an analysis that
suggests secured creditor control theory is overstated, see generally Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Secured Creditor
Control and Bankruptcy Sales: An Empirical View, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 831-848.
28
Concentrated secured creditor power diminishes Chapter 11’s ability to achieve the goals of “reorganization of
businesses and the maximization of asset values for all creditors.” Juliet M. Moringiello, When Does Some Federal
Interest Require a Different Result?: An Essay on the Use and Misuse of Butner v. United States, 2015 U. ILL. L.
REV. 657, 658-59. Tilting the power back to the debtor away from secured creditors enhances the underlying
reorganization goal of Chapter 11.
29
See infra notes 153-169 and accompanying text (analyzing the use of settlements as a rescue tool post-Jevic).
30
See infra notes 170-188 and accompanying text (analyzing the use of § 363 as a rescue tool post-Jevic).
31
See infra notes 189-205 and accompanying text (analyzing the use of first day orders, their role in promoting
rescue and how Jevic may impact them as effective tools). See also, Hollace T. Cohen, Pre-Plan Settlements PostJevic – Jevic’s Impact on the Absolute Priority Rule and Other Core Bankruptcy Principles, 27 NORT. J. BANKR. L
& PRACT.1, 16-23 (2018) (analyzing the impact of Jevic on settlements and first day orders that violate the APR);
Ralph Brubaker, Taking Bankruptcy’s Distribution Rules Seriously: How the Supreme Court Saved Bankruptcy from
Self-Destruction, 37 BANKR. L. LETTER 1, 1 (2017) (questioning validity of priority-skipping devices post-Jevic).
21
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Following this Introduction, an overview of the broad conceptualization of rescue policy
in Chapter 11 as used in this article is explored. Part III details the cross-class cram down and the
role of the APR in Chapter 11. Part IV summarizes Jevic and its cascading effect on rescue tools.
The need for reform and shortcomings of prior U.S. reform proposals pertaining to the APR are
addressed in Part V. This is followed by Part VI which highlights key aspects of the proposed
U.K. reform that can guide U.S. reform, along with a specific reform proposal. Part VII provides
the conclusion.
II.

Conceptualization of Rescue Policy in Chapter 11

Any consideration of a reform in a particular policy domain must begin with a clear
articulation of the goal of that particular policy domain. Only with a clear goal in mind, can the
existence of a problem be determined, or perhaps a potential problem, that policymakers need to
address.32 The policy goal is inextricably linked to the definition of the policy problem and the
ultimate policy solution to the defined problem.33
In this section the theoretical and normative debate around the rescue policy goal in
Chapter 11 is explored. Following that foundational discussion, the primary rescue policy goal
reflected in Chapter 11, the reorganization of the company and the parameters it entails, is detailed.
In the final subsection, reorganization of the company, it is argued, is too restrictive of a policy
goal and a broader conceptualization of rescue is offered. The rescue goal of Chapter 11 should
encompass rescuing the company, as well as the business.34 This sets the stage to consider, in
Parts III and IV, the current application of the APR, Jevic and the problems each present for
Chapter 11 in achieving a policy goal consistent with a broad conceptualization of rescue. With
those problems identified in light of the broad policy goal of rescue, the policy reform to address
these problems can be considered.
A.

The Theoretical and Normative Debate

When a company is economically viable but experiencing cash-flow insolvency, i.e.
financial distress,35 most bankruptcy scholars agree that Chapter 11 can be used to address the
common pool problem caused by a race to the courthouse among individual creditors. 36 Further
agreement is found in Chapter 11s role at maximizing value of the debtor’s pool of assets.37 At
this point, there is divergence among scholars at what the policy goal of Chapter 11 should be in
32

Professor Jackson recognized this basic and fundamental step in bankruptcy policymaking. See THOMAS H.
JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 2-3 (1986). There must be an understanding of what
bankruptcy can and should do, i.e. the goal of bankruptcy law. Id. With that underpinning “problems” in the
bankruptcy system can be resolved. Id.
33
For a discussion of the importance of problem definition in a policy analysis and reform efforts, see Nan. S. Ellis
& Cheryl M. Miller, Welfare Waiting Periods: A Public Policy Analysis of Saenza v. Roe, 11 STAN. FL. & POL’Y
REV. 343, n. 122 (2000). See also John A. Kingdon, A Model of Agenda-Setting, with Applications, 2001 L. REV.
MICH. ST. U. DETROIT C. L. 331, 331-32 (Kingdon sets forth his streams theory where the problem, policy and
political (solution) streams all operate independently but converge to achieve policy change.).
34
For a thoughtful analysis of the trend for a broad conceptualization of rescue, a “rescue culture,” see generally
Verdoes & Verweij, supra note 15, at 399-401.
35
Alan Schwartz, A Normative Theory of Business Bankruptcy, 91 VA. L. REV. 1199, 1200 (2005) (“A firm is only
in financial distress if it would have positive earnings were it not required to service its debt.”).
36
Paterson, Rethinking, supra note 18, at 698.
37
Id.
4

terms of distribution of the pool of assets.38 Painting with broad strokes, on one side of the modern
debate are law and economic scholars advancing the creditors’ bargain theory,39 under which the
pre-bankruptcy rights of creditors should be given effect in Chapter 11, except when prebankruptcy rights interfere with maximization of the pool of assets.40 On the other side of the
debate are scholars in the progressive school41 advocating a more eclectic view of the policy goal
of Chapter 11 so that distributions consider the consequences of the financial failure among a
panoply of actors and interests, not just the creditors.42 Each side of the debate over what Chapter
11 should do43 –maximize the return to creditors only or consider other goals and interests44 needs unpacking.45
1. Creditors’ Bargain
In the early 1980s the creditors’ bargain theory was advanced by Professor Thomas
Jackson,46 and was developed in writings with Professor Douglas Baird47 and Professor Robert
Scott.48 The creditors’ bargain theory was also the normative cornerstone of Jackson’s book, The
Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law.49 In Jackson’s view bankruptcy is designed to address the
common pool problem that arises by individual collection action.50 As such, bankruptcy is debtcollection law.51 The objective of bankruptcy law under this law and economics framework is “to
maximize the collective returns to creditors.”52
According to Jackson, the only relevant question for bankruptcy is what “is the most
appropriate deployment for the group of the firm’s assets given the initial entitlements.”53 Initial
entitlements are those that exist outside of bankruptcy law under state law. The bankruptcy system
should “mirror the agreement one would expect the creditors to form among themselves were they

38

See id.
Paterson, Rethinking, supra note 18, at 699.
40
VANESSA FINCH & DAVID MILMAN, CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW: PERSPECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES, THIRD
EDITION 29 (2017).
41
Paterson, Rethinking, supra note 18, at 699 (characterizing scholars on this side as the “progressive school”). See
also DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 12 (2001)
(characterizing the policy debate tween the law and economics scholars and the “progressive scholars”).
42
FINCH & MILAM, supra note 40, at 40.
43
The debate, as Professor Skeel viewed it, was about the “nature and purpose of bankruptcy.” SKEEL, supra note
41, at 12.
44
See BO XIE, COMPARATIVE INSOLVENCY LAW: THE PRE-PACK APPROACH IN CORPORATE RESCUE 8 (2016)
(characterizing the two viewpoints of the debate).
45
For a succinct summary contrasting the two schools of thought on reorganization policy, see Vincent S.J. Buccola,
The Janas Faces of Reorganization Law, 44 J. CORP. L. 1, 5-6 (2018).
46
Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857,
860 (1982) [hereafter Jackson, Bankruptcy].
47
See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L.
REV. 829 (1985).
48
See Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and
the Creditors’ Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155 (1989). For a comprehensive collection of the literature developing the
creditors bargain theory, see Buccola, supra note 45, at 6, n.17.
49
See JACKSON, supra note 32, at 21-22.
50
Id. at 10-11, 21.
51
Id. at 3.
52
FINCH & MILAM, supra note 40, at 28-29.
53
JACKSON, supra note 32, at 210.
39
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able to negotiate such an agreement from an ex ante position.”54 Under the creditors’ bargain
theory the rights of creditors outside of bankruptcy should not be altered in bankruptcy, except if
it is something creditors would have hypothetically have agreed to.55 The theory is contractarian
in nature.56 Once the terms that creditors would have hypothetically agreed upon are derived, that
is the basis with which to critique bankruptcy law.57
Thus under this view of the role of bankruptcy law, the only focus is on hypothetical
contract creditors.58 The focus on creditor wealth maximization does not leave room for
consideration of other interests and stakeholders.59 A more expansive view of bankruptcy policy,
according to Jackson, “would lead to costly, inefficient struggles between parties who prefer
nonbankruptcy law and those who fare better in bankruptcy.”60 That more expansive view of
bankruptcy policy brings us to the other side of the debate advanced by the progressives.
2. Progressive School
Although the creditors’ bargain theory has been quite influential61 and adopted by many,62
it has received extensive criticism from progressive scholars.63 The progressive school views the
normative goal of Chapter 11 to encompass much more than simply the enhancement of the
collection efforts creditors.64 This school believes that Chapter 11 policy should encompass the
interests of a wide array of actors including creditors, but also employees, taxing authorities,
suppliers, customers and others impacted by a business failure.65 This approach to bankruptcy
policy is eclectic in nature and considers multiple values.66 Bankruptcy policy in the progressive’s
54

Jackson, Bankruptcy, supra note 46, at 860.
See Thomas H. Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 725, 750 (1984) (Under the
“creditors’ bargain model . . . nonbankruptcy entitlements . . .should constitute the normative baseline for valuing
bankruptcy entitlements and that a collective proceeding must upset only those rules that work to the detriment of
the creditors as a group.”). As Professor Buccola explained, under the creditors’ theory bargain “bankruptcy
justifiably alters creditor rights, as defined by ordinary commercial law, only to the extent creditors and other
investors would agree to such changes in a hypothetical world of costless bargains.” Buccola, supra note 45, at 6.
See also Lynn M. LoPucki, A Team Production Theory of Bankruptcy Reorganization, 57 VA. L. REV. 741, 744-745
(2004) (explaining the creditors’ bargain theory).
56
Buccola, supra note 45, at 6; LoPucki, supra note 55, at 745.
57
LoPucki, supra note 55, at 745.
58
XIE, supra note 44, at 10.
59
Id. at 10.
60
SKEEL, supra note 41, at 13.
61
FINCH & MILAM, supra note 40, at 29.
62
Buccola, supra note 45, at 6.
63
FINCH & MILAM, supra note 40, at 29-30. See also, Buccola, supra note 45, at 6 (noting the countervailing
viewpoint raised in opposition to the creditors’ bargain theory). For example, see Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy
Policy, 54 U. CHIC. L. REV. 775, 77 (1987) (views bankruptcy policy has dealing with the distribution of losses
among a host of actors and competing interests – not just addressing the enhancement of collection efforts for
creditors) [hereafter Warren, Bankruptcy]; Donald B. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of
Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 762, 781 (1991) (proposing an alternative to the creditors’ bargain model to
one that includes a consideration of non-economic values and dimensions including “moral, political, personal and
social” values); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REV. 336, 337, n.4
(1993) (collecting scholarship challenging creditors’ bargain theory) [hereafter Warren, Imperfect]; LoPucki, supra
note 45, 744-49 (critiquing creditors’ bargain theory).
64
Warren, Bankruptcy, supra note 63, at 777.
65
Warren, Imperfect, supra note 63, at 354-55.
66
FINCH & MILAM, supra note 40, at 29.
55

6

view cannot be reduced a single economic construct.67 A bankruptcy reorganization is complex
and dirty, and even though there are a host of interconnected actors and interests at play, it is
elastic.68 Bankruptcy policy, according to the progressives, should reflect these varying interests
and not the single vision advocated by the law and economic scholars.
B.

Rescue Policy Reflected in Chapter 11

There are aspects of the creditors’ bargain theory and the progressive school reflected in
the Bankruptcy Code. However, on the whole the theoretical underpinnings of the progressive
school of thought is more prevalent in Chapter 11 than creditors’ bargain theory.69 A consideration
of the options available for a company in Chapter 11 highlights this policy orientation.
There are two options to deal with the financial distress in Chapter 11: rescue the company
in its present form or rescue the business in a new entity.70 First, rescue of the company entails a
rehabilitation through a reorganization or restructuring of the company’s debt.71 Chapter 11’s
policy goal is firmed rooted in a rescue of the company through reorganization or restructuring the
company.72 The Bankruptcy Code gives a Chapter 11 debtor powers that give the debtor leverage
to facilitate a rescue of the company.73 Such powers include debtor-in-possession control,74
exclusivity to propose a reorganization plan,75 an ipso facto ban76 and the ability to assume, reject
and assign contracts.77 The premise of this emphasis on debtor power or control is that the debtor

67

Warren, Bankruptcy, supra note 63, at 811.
Id.
69
Paterson, Rethinking, supra note 18, at 699.
70
See Payne, Lessons, supra note 18, at 282 (detailing the options).
71
Id. at 282.
72
Courts have recognized that Chapter 11’s paramount goal is to rehabilitate the debtor. Lynn M. LoPucki,
Changes in Chapter 11 Success Levels Since 1980, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 989, 998 (2015) (citations omitted). This
rehabilitation or reorganization is designed to save or rescue, the company – the goal of Chapter 11. See id.
73
See Comment, Elizabeth B. Rose, Chocolate, Flowers, and § 363(b): The Opportunity for Sweetheart Deals
without Chapter 11 Protections, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 249, 254 (2006) (recognizing the powers provided to a
debtor in Chapter 11 that provide “the debtor leveraging power in a reorganization”). Congress recognized this need
to give the debtor power in Chapter 11 to facilitate a rescue. See H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., at 231232 ("Proposed Chapter 11 recognizes the need for the debtor to remain in control to some degree, or else debtors
will avoid the reorganization provisions in the bill until it would be too late for them to be an effective remedy.).
74
Rose, supra note 74, at 254. See also Foteini Teloni, The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act: An Empirical Examination of the Act’s Business Bankruptcy Effects, 88 AM. BANKR. L.J. 237, 240 (2014)
(observing that debtor-in-possession feature gives the debtor-in-possession control in the Chapter 11 process).
75
11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (providing exclusivity for debtor to file a plan of reorganization). See also Rose, supra note
74, at 255 (noting the control exclusivity gives a debtor-in-possession); Teloni, supra note 75, at 240 (discussing
role exclusivity plays in giving debtor-in-possession control in Chapter 11).
76
For example, in the context of utilities § 366 of the Code limits the ability of a utility to modify services postpetition for twenty-one days so as to provide the debtor-in-possession the opportunity to provide adequate assurance
of payment. Teloni, supra note 75, at 247-48.
77
For example, in the context of commercial leases a debtor-in-possession is given certain limited rights early on in
a case under § 365. See Teloni, supra note 75, at 250-54 (discussing the rights of the debtor-in-possession and
balancing of those with that of the landlord).
68

7

will promote a rescue the company through reorganization78 which is the value maximizing option
in Chapter 11.79
Under this option, the rescue of the company, the Bankruptcy Code does provide
“distributional entitlements only to creditors and shareholders”80 through the APR 81 which is
consistent with the creditors’ bargain theory.82 However, in application, the APR is not
consistently adhered to.83 That deviation from the APR is consistent with the progressive school
in that it moves away from the creditors’ bargain theory to consider other interests at play in
Chapter 11.
The second option, a rescue of the business in a new entity, typically involves a sale of the
company to a new company,84 preserving the going concern value of the business.85 Although,
such a sale does not fit squarely within the traditional reorganization goal of the company, the
Bankruptcy Code does provide statutory authority for the sale of the business as a going concern.86
With the law on the books permitting such sales, practitioners have adapted their Chapter 11
practice in recent years away from the traditional goal of rescuing the company through a
reorganization plan to rescuing the business through a sale of the business. Such sales of the
businesses as a going concern in Chapter 11 have increased in recent years, accounting for at least
30 percent of all Chapter 11s.87 Thus, facilitating a rescue through a sale of the business as a going
concern, is a viable option in Chapter 11.
The rescue of the business through a sale can be consistent with both the creditors’ bargain
theory and the progressive school. Which policy orientation a sale of the business advances will
depend on the outcome of the sale. For example, a sale of the business may very well bring the
most return to creditors and it may keep many jobs intact, keep many suppliers contracts in place
and continue the business in the community it is located. In such a sale the creditors’ bargain
theory is enhanced as presumably such a sale has enhanced the value of the business. Also, the
progressive school concern over other interests outside of creditors such as employee, suppliers or
broader community interests may be enhanced or, at least the detrimental impact of the financial
distress, is minimized.

78

See Rose, supra note 74, at 254-55 (observing that debtor-in-possession control enhances opportunity for
successful reorganization).
79
It is generally viewed that a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization process with bargaining among the players will
foster value maximization. See, e.g., J. Bradley Johnston, The Bankruptcy Bargain, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 213, 257
(1991). The power or control the debtor has facilitates that bargaining process in proposing a reorganization plan.
80
LoPucki, supra note 55, at 768.
81
See infra notes 111-114 and accompanying text (summarizing the APR).
82
See LoPucki, supra note55_, at 768 (noting that the cramdown provisions of Chapter 11 are consistent with
creditors’ bargain theory).
83
See infra notes 135-136 and accompanying text.
84
Johnson, supra note 80, at 282.
85
See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 673, 688, 691-692
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A third option is available to address financial distress of a company that has progressed to
an economically unviable state, i.e. economic distress:88 a liquidation of assets.89 Here the value
of the assets sold separately is greater than the going concern value of the net worth of the
company.90 The Bankruptcy Code expressly provides for this option. Chapter 11 provides for a
liquidating plan.91 Additionally a company may file for Chapter 792 and liquidate93 or a Chapter
11 debtor can convert to Chapter 7 for a liquidation.94 These options seek to provide a greater
return to creditors than the return available in a rescue of the company or rescue the business as a
going concern when the company is in economic distress.
This option promotes the creditor’s bargain theory as it expressly seeks to enhance the
creditors’ return. This policy orientation makes sense in this context – economic distress of the
company. It assumes that the company is not economically viable, so the only thing that can be
done is a liquidation to maximize the return. Although, progressives would not view this as the
preferred outcome, Chapter 11 can only do so much and if a company is not viable, liquidation,
which will negatively impact a whole host of non-creditor interest, may be the only option. At
least in this context, Chapter 11 can serve a debt-collection tool to try to maximize the return to
creditors.
C.

Broad Conceptualization of Rescue Policy in Chapter 11

The view of Chapter 11 from the creditors’ bargain and progressive perspectives are quite
stark. Chapter 11 positive law, in large part, reflects the progressive school view, but certainly
includes attributes of the creditors’ bargain theory. Neither view is fully satisfactory. The rescue
policy reflected in Chapter 11 of the Code is too limited.
Rescue in Chapter 11 should not be limited to merely the reorganization or restructuring a
company.95 Rescue is a broad construct that certainly includes the reorganization and restructuring
of a company, but it also includes preserving the going concern of a viable business – the rescue
of the business.96 Chapter 11’s policy goal should be broader and encompass rescue as used in
modern Chapter 11 practice – rescuing the business, as well as rescuing the company.97
This broader orientation does not discard the importance and consideration of creditor
interests. It does not discount the importance of considering a whole host of actors and interests
that may be impacted by Chapter 11. All actors and interests impacted by a Chapter 11 bankruptcy
should be considered. Chapter 11 is not necessarily a zero-sum game. There will be gains and
Schwartz, supra note 35, at 1200 (“Economic distress occurs when the firm cannot earn revenues sufficient to
cover its costs, exclusive of financing costs. Such a firm has negative economic value.”).
89
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90
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losses among the various interests. Chapter 11 policy should encompass a panoply of interests
with the aim of rescue, whether through reorganization of the company or rescue of the business,
for economically viable companies.
Over twenty-five years ago Professor Westbrook recognized a broad view of rescue in
noting that the options available in a rescue regime include an administration with a quick sale, a
reorganization through a financial restructuring and a third approach, without articulating what
that approach may be.98 Reorganization through financial restructuring fits neatly within the
traditional policy orientation of Chapter 11: reorganization of the company. However,
administration through a quick sale, particularly the sale of substantially all of the assets as a whole,
embraces a broad concept of rescue: rescuing a business. And Westbrook’s third, yet undefined
option, offers an even broader orientation of rescue that certainly encompasses rescue of the
business.
This type of broad rescue orientation for Chapter 11 reflects the reality of the environment
that Chapter 11 operates in. Times have changed since the enactment of the Code in 1978.
Chapter 11 was created at time in which the economy was a traditionally manufacturing based
economy, but the economy has been transformed to one that is more information based, in which
the most valuable assets may be the relationship networks and human capital.99 Companies’ assets
are less hard assets, and more intangible assets including services, intellectual property or
contracts.100 The composition of creditors’ classes has changed since 1978 with claims trading
and derivative products.101 A going concern sale of a business for such companies operating in an
information based environment may be the best way to capture the value of the business.102 An
orientation of Chapter 11 that is narrow in scope emphasizing the reorganization of the company
or the normative goal articulated by creditors’ bargain theory is not adequate. Companies operate
in a different environment and Chapter 11 “was not originally designed to rehabilitate companies
efficaciously in this complex environment.”103
Modern Chapter 11 practice reflects Westbrook’s broad conceptualization of rescue – the
traditional policy goal of rescuing the company through reorganization as well as modern Chapter
11 practice of a rescuing a business through a sale. This broader conceptualization of rescue in
Chapter 11 was recently recognized by the Eleventh Circuit when the court noted that the sale of
substantially all of a debtor’s assets in Chapter 11 can advance the goals of Chapter 11.104 Rescue
as used throughout this article encompasses this broad conceptualization of rescue. It is the
benchmark to gauge whether reforms are needed.
III.

Cross-Class Cram Down and the Role of the Absolute Priority Rule in Chapter 11

The Bankruptcy Code permits two types of cram down in the confirmation of a Chapter 11
plan. Confirmation of a plan of reorganization is permitted over dissenting impaired creditors
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within a class if that class votes to accept the plan treatment105 and cross-class cram down over an
entire class of dissenting impaired creditors is permitted if the APR is satisfied.106 Although cram
down within a class raises some concerns over the protection of minority interests, the cross-class
cram down raises a greater level of concern over the protection of minority interests,107 which
brings into play the APR.108
In order to confirm a Chapter 11 plan over a dissenting impaired creditor class, the APR
requires “that a dissenting class of unsecured creditors must be provided for in full before any
junior class can receive or retain any property [under a reorganization] plan.’”109 A creditor, absent
consent, must receive the same value of the debtor’s assets in a bankruptcy that the creditor would
receive outside of bankruptcy.110 The theory behind the concept of absolute priority is that senior
creditors should recover the amount they are owed – no more, no less.111 General creditors should
be paid in full before equity interests receive anything.112
The APR is a product of judicial construction with its origins in the equity receivership
reorganization cases,113 but it is now codified in the “fair and equitable”114 requirement of the
Code.115 It is rooted in the “common law maxim that creditors would be paid ahead of equity.”116
It is a type of minority creditor protection designed to avoid the problems associated with
information asymmetry and disparities in control of a debtor that possibly could result with owners,
insiders or a controlling secured creditor reaping value from a failing business for their own
benefit.117 If a party appropriates value in a business for their own benefit – creditor or
105
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equityholder – the party whose priority rights have been infringed upon should be able assert that
their rights have been violated under the APR.118
Although the APR can offer protection to minority interests, its application has been
criticized.119 It is viewed as an impediment to reorganizations in that it increases costs, limits
compromise and may eliminate junior interests unnecessarily.120 For example, as Professor Warren
explained, if old equity is barred from participating in a reorganized debtor (i.e. retain their equity
interest) under a strict application of the APR because a senior class of creditors object to the
reorganization plan, then the APR may actually impede a reorganization.121 If holdout creditors
overvalue their position, the APR will ensure their participation but this may lead to a break down
in bargaining resulting in a failed reorganization or in a diversion of value of the company to
holdout creditors.122 Moreover, a carte blanche application of the APR to prohibit participation
by equity in the reorganized debtor may reduce the going-concern value of the debtor because the
equity holder’s knowledge, attributes of continued management and willingness to fund the debtor
may be lost.123
Importantly, by the letter of the Code, the APR only applies to distributions in
nonconsensual plans of reorganization subject to a cram down.124 However, the APR principle is
often employed in other aspects of Chapter 11 as a normative guiding principle.125 When the APR
is applied in a broad way throughout Chapter 11 as a principle it bolsters its importance. The
criticisms of a rigid application APR in the context of a confirmation of a plan, highlighted above,
carry over to a rigid application in other aspects of a Chapter 11 reorganization.
A strict application of the APR, whether under the Code in a cram down scenario or as a
guiding principle in other contexts, is impractical and ignores the dynamic nature of business
outside and inside a Chapter 11 reorganization.126 Outside of bankruptcy the rigid application of
the APR does not exist.127 Businesses decide to pay some creditors, delay payment and to not pay
others in the operations of their business based on business needs and not legal priority.128 Within
a bankruptcy reorganization these business decisions are still at play, albeit overseen by the
bankruptcy court.129 The business in bankruptcy is not merely a pool of assets to be distributed,130
but rather a dynamic creature making business decisions and often making distributions to
creditors that run afoul of the notion of absolute priority with the blessing of the bankruptcy
118
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court.131 These priority-violating distributions, such as paying critical venders, employees or
settlement payments,132 are all done in an effort to enhance the long-term value of the debtor’s
estate.133 These are not rigid priority driven decisions, but rather practical oriented decisions that
debtors make and bankruptcy courts approve with an eye towards an ultimate rescue in a case.
Thus, the “absolute” nature of the APR is in reality a fiction – outside of and within Chapter 11,134
at least in contexts outside the confirmation of a plan.135
Even though the application of the APR is not “absolute” in practice, that does not obviate
the need for the reform proposed herein. The debtor in Chapter 11 needs to be able to deal with
all creditors from the beginning of the case through the confirmation of a plan without application
of a mandatory rule of absolute priority in the confirmation of a plan or as a principle applied
throughout a case. Flexibility in application of the APR, subject to judicial supervision, can avoid
the problems associated with a rigid application of the APR. If the rule is more flexible in the
context of the confirmation of a plan, the normative principle of absolute priority in other aspects
of the case will likewise be more flexible in nature. The case for this type of reform is strengthened
when we consider how the cascading effect of Jevic, as outlined in the next section, exacerbates
the difficulties associated with a rigid application APR throughout a case.
IV.

Jevic and its Cascading Effect
A. Jevic in a Nutshell

The basic facts of Jevic are straightforward.136 Two creditors (Sun and CIT), Jevic (the
debtor) and the unsecured creditors committee137 reached a settlement resolving litigation among
the parties that would result in the following: (1) CIT paying $2 million dollars to cover unsecured
creditors’ committee’s fees; (2) Sun assigning a lien in Jevic’s remaining cash ($1.7 million
dollars) so that administrative expenses and taxes could be paid, with the balance of funds going
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to general unsecured creditors; and (3) dismissal of the Chapter 11 case.138 The settlement required
that the funds assigned by Sun not be distributed to priority wage claims.139
This distribution violated the Code’s priority rules because the priority wage claims were
skipped in favor of lower general unsecured claims.140 This provided the Supreme Court the
opportunity to determine the applicability of the APR in a non-confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan
context. The Supreme Court provided an answer to this narrow question: whether, in the absent
of consent, can a bankruptcy court “approve a structured dismissal that provides for distributions
that do not follow ordinary priority rules[?]”141 The Supreme Court said no142 and held that the
priority rules, such as the APR, are applicable in the context of a Chapter 11 structured dismissal.143
B. Cascading Effect of Jevic
Although the Jevic holding is limited to structured dismissals that violate the APR,144 it has
important implications beyond the structured dismissal. Dissenting Justices Alito and Thomas
noted the “novel and important question” the case presented145 and scholars are recognizing the
significance of the opinion.146 The importance of Jevic is also seen as courts begin to grapple with
applying the decision.147 It is in the application of Jevic to other rescue tools - settlements, § 363
sales and first-day orders148 - that may violate the APR in which Jevic’s importance materializes.149
If the effective use of these tools is curtailed post-Jevic, the capacity of Chapter 11 to promote the
broad orientation of rescue, as well enhancing the value of the estate, may be undercut, making
the need to reform the APR more pressing. The impact of Jevic on these three tools is detailed
below.
1. Settlements
Bankruptcy judges have authority to approve a settlement between a debtor and other
parties, such as creditors and committees, if the court finds the settlement fair and equitable.150
The ability for the debtor and the parties in a Chapter 11 case to compromise and settle disputes is
an important rescue tool. The more that contested issues are resolved consensually prior to a
138
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confirmation hearing of a plan of reorganization, the more likely a plan will be confirmed provided
it does not violate the Code’s requirements for confirmation.151 Confirmation of the plan will not
guarantee that a Chapter 11 will successfully achieve Chapter 11s rescue goal, but confirmation of
a plan certainly enhances the prospects of rescue. Thus, the ability to reach settlements and
compromises along the way toward confirmation is a vital rescue tool.
In Jevic the Supreme Court discussed settlements that include interim distributions that
violate the Code’s priority rules contrasting them with structured dismissals with final
distributions.152 This discussion was dicta, but implicit in the Court’s discussion is that interim
distributions may be permissible if there are “significant offsetting bankruptcy–related
justification[s]”,153 whereas final distributions in a structured dismissal with no justification for
violating the priorities of the Code is impermissible.154 Bankruptcy courts are beginning to tackle
approval of settlements post-Jevic.
For example, in the case of In re Fryar155 a bankruptcy court, relying on Jevic, denied
approval of a settlement, over objection, that included distributions that violated the Code’s
priority rules because there was no “significant code-related objective.”156 Similarly, a bankruptcy
court in the case of In re Constellation,157 relying on Jevic, did not approve a settlement, over
objection, that violated the APR.158 Just as in Fryar, there was no evidence that the settlement
promoted saving the business or plan,159 i.e., no “significant code-related objective” for violating
APR.
In a third bankruptcy decision, In re Short Bark Industries, Inc.,160 the bankruptcy court
approved a settlement, over objection, as part of a proposed debtor-in-possession financing which
provided for escrowing $110,000 for payment of general unsecured creditors, thus skipping
priority and administrative claims.161 The bankruptcy court distinguished Jevic because the
settlement was early in the case, its approval provided for the continued employment of over 500
people and it permitted the business to continue.162 Thus, in contrast to Fryar and Constellation,
there was a “significant code-related objective” to deviate from the Code’s priority scheme.
Post-Jevic, beyond showing a settlement is “fair and equitable”,163 parties seeking approval
of a settlement with interim distributions that violate the underlying priority principle of the APR
will likely need to make an additional showing of a “significant offsetting bankruptcy-related
justification.”164 This may be able to be shown as in the Short Bark case, but in cases where there
151
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is no rescue on the horizon, obtaining approval of a settlement that violates the priority rules in the
APR will likely be a difficult task post-Jevic. If this showing cannot be made, then the APR as a
principle, which Jevic certainly embraced in the structured dismissal context,165 may hamper the
approval of settlements or compromises. Settlements with certain parties, that violate the priority
principle behind the APR, may be necessary in a case to facilitate the continued operation of a
debtor or help maintain the going concern value of the business on the road to a plan of
reorganization or a sale. Outside of Chapter 11 businesses do not adhere to rigid legal priority in
reaching settlements and compromises.166 Rather these are often business driven decisions. This
potential limitation that Jevic presents on reaching settlements in a Chapter 11 may infringe upon
the ability to foster rescue through a plan of reorganization or a sale. Such an outcome runs afoul
of promoting rescue, as well as the underlying value maximization goal of those in the law and
economics school.
2. § 363(b) Sales
In Jevic the Supreme Court recognized that there are three conclusions to a Chapter 11
case: confirmation of a plan which may include a distribution of assets and possibly the
continuation of the business; conversion to Chapter 7 for liquidation; or dismissal.167 The Eleventh
Circuit recently noted the options to bring a Chapter 11 to conclusion are a little broader, to include
a sale of substantially all of a debtor’s assets under § 363.168 In fact, the sale of substantially all
of a Chapter 11 debtor’s assets under § 363(b), rather than through a plan, to a successor
corporation169 is the rescue tool of choice in an increasingly number of Chapter 11s.170 Such a sale
may or may not be followed by a liquidation plan,171 conversion to Chapter 7172 or a dismissal.173
The § 363(b) sale of substantially of a debtor’s assets is a vital rescue tool.174 Just as with
a successful classic Chapter 11 with a plan of reorganization in which the business continues to
operate, a § 363(b) sale of substantially of assets as a going concern the underlying business is not
shut down as in a Chapter 7 liquidation.175
The outcome of this
type of sale “bears a close resemblance to the end result of a classic reorganization.”176 This
outcome through a § 363(b) is quicker than a Chapter 11 plan and can be accomplished without
165
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meeting the requirements of the Chapter 11 plan process.177 The quicker process saves not only
time and monetary costs associated with the plan process,178 but helps preserve the going concern
value of the business.179
Post-Jevic if a proposed § 363(b) sale includes distributions that violate the APR the
approval of the sale may be subject to attack because the logic of Jevic in prohibiting priority
violating final distributions in a structured dismissal are applicable to such a sale.180 For example,
the First Circuit was presented with the argument that the bankruptcy court’s approval of a § 363(b)
sale violated Jevic because the sale provided for payment of some unsecured claims without paying
higher priority administrative claims. 181 The distributions violated the APR.182 The First Circuit
did not address the merits of the argument because the sale order was final and not stayed under §
363(m),183 but the case shows how the argument can be presented and but for the procedural
quandary of the appellant, the court would have had to address the applicability of Jevic to § 363(b)
sales.
The ability to facilitate rescues through § 363(b) sales may be curtailed in light of the
uncertainty of Jevic’s applicability to such sales. It is likely that bankruptcy courts will reach
divergent viewpoints on this issue. As the parties litigate, the advantages of § 363(b) sales, such
as the savings in monetary costs, quick outcomes, and preservation of the going concern value of
a business, may be diminished. Post-Jevic, the importance of this rescue tool may be lessened, at
least in the short term, and perhaps longer term depending on how courts apply Jevic. If this tool
is less effective, rescue policy will be eroded, particularly since many Chapter 11 cases are
resolved with § 363(b) sales of substantially all assets, rather than the traditional Chapter 11 plan
of reorganization as in the past.184 This erosion of rescue will likely harm creditors and all
stakeholders if sales are less effective, particularly since stakeholders can realize as much value
under a sale as a plan of reorganization.185 The will not only erode the broad conceptualization of
rescue advocated herein, but also the more creditor dominated orientation as advocated the law
and economics scholars, as delayed sales or piecemeal sales may result is diminution of value of
the pool of assets available for distribution.
3. First-Day Orders
Often at the outset of a Chapter 11 filing a debtor will file certain motions, collectively
called “first-day motions.”186 In such motions a Chapter 11 debtor may seek authority to pay
177

In re Walter Energy, Inc. et al., 911 F.3d at 1153.
Bodoh & Morgan, supra note 179, at 335 (“One advantage that a section 363 sale has over a sale pursuant to a
plan of reorganization is efficiency, in terms of both time and money.”).
179
Georgakopoulos, supra note 139, at 921 (“Sales realize value, preserve going-concern value, resolve
uncertainties, and restore productivity in ways that fundamentally promote the goals of reorganization . . .”).
180
See Brubaker, supra note 31, at 4, 8 (noting the applicability of the logic of Jevic to other priority-skipping
mechanisms, including sales).
181
In re Old Cold LLC, 879 F.3d 376, 388 (1 st Cir. 2018).
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process in Chapter 11
Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862, 865-66, 877, n.54 (2014).
185
See, e.g., Jarad A. Wilkerson, Defending the Current State of Section 363 Sales, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 591, 625-26
(2012) (presenting the argument that in a § 363 sales creditors generally are able ensure the business is sold for fair
value).
186
In re The Colad Group, Inc., 324 B.R. 208, 212 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 2005).
178

17

certain creditors for pre-petition services or goods that the debtor views as vital to continued
operations of the business, i.e., the creditor is a “critical” vendor.187 In some instances requests to
pay prepetition wages of employees are included in such motions.188 Sometimes debtor-inpossession financing is included in such motions that provides for paying a lender on their
prepetition claim first when the lender continues financing the debtor post-petition - a “roll-up.”189
Such payments violate the priority structure of the Code and are not expressly authorized by the
Code, but some courts approve such payments out of necessity to promote the reorganization of
the debtor.190
The idea behind permitting these priority violating distributions is that they are needed to
make a reorganization successful.191 For example, employees may leave if pre-petition wages are
not paid or vendors of important supplies that are not paid for prepetition supplies may not trade
with the debtor post-petition. If valuable employees leave or important vendors do not trade, it
may be a significant constraint on the debtor’s ability to rescue the business. Some employees
may be so vital that the business will have trouble continuing to operate. Other critical vendors
who provide services or goods that are vital to an operation may actually lead to standstill of
operations.192 Debtor-in-possession financing that includes priority violating provisions can be
justified under the logic of other critical vendor orders.193 Post-petition financing is necessary to
keep the business trading and incentives such as “roll-ups” are needed to obtain the financing.
Post-petition financing is a type of critical vendor – financial capital.194 Thus, the use of first-day
motions to obtain these types of relief are an important tools in rescuing a business. Bankruptcy
courts when presented with such motions commonly grant them.195
In Jevic the Supreme Court discussed, in dicta, first-day orders and arguably196 approved
such orders if they had a “significant offsetting bankruptcy-related justification.”197 Whether Jevic
sanctions approval of such orders across the board is doubtful because the logic behind striking
down the structured dismissal is applicable to first-day orders that violate the APR.198 At least one
bankruptcy court post-Jevic has not interpreted the dicta so broadly.
In the case of In re Pioneer Health Services, Inc.,199 the bankruptcy court considered Jevic
and viewed it as providing a “restrictive view of critical vendor payments” and that such payments
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should be limited to those that have “significant offsetting bankruptcy-related justification.”200 In
so doing the bankruptcy court did not approve payments to physicians for prepetition claims as
critical vendors of the debtor which operated hospitals and other health care facilities because there
was no showing of a “significant offsetting bankruptcy-related justification.”201
This interpretation of Jevic indicates that post-Jevic first-day orders that violate the Code’s
priority structure may well be subject to higher scrutiny.202 If the ability to pay employee prepetition wages, pay critical vendors or obtain post-petition financing is limited in light Jevic, the
ability of Chapter 11 to facilitate a rescue may be compromised. For example, in the context of
post-petition financing, the only game in town for a debtor to obtain post-petition financing may
be the pre-petition lender and the inability to provide that lender a “roll-up” may be a deal breaker.
If that is the case, and if there is not another vehicle to obtain post-petition capital, the ability of
Chapter 11 to enable a rescue may well be short-lived. Similar arguments can be made with critical
vendors or vital employees. If certain employees are an integral part of the business of a debtor
and the skills and services provided are not easily replaceable, without the ability to provide
priority violating distributions, the viability of the business will be marginalized. Rescue will be
eroded and the value of the estate may well be diminished.
V.

Need for Reform and Prior U.S. Reform Proposals

The traditional criticism of a strict application of the APR, i.e. that it is an impediment to
reorganization, applies today just as it has in the past. However, with the cascading effect of Jevic
on important rescue tools in modern Chapter 11 practice the traditional criticism has more teeth.
Reform to the Code is necessary to lessen the bite of a rigid application of the APR. In crafting a
reform, consideration of prior U.S. reform proposals can be a starting point. Even though prior
reform proposals, as discussed below, do not adequately address the problems associated with the
APR, they illustrate some options available for reform.
In the 1970s the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States (Commission)
effectively proposed abolishment of the APR because it was viewed as largely impractical in
application, but the proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973 never became law.203 This proposed reform
was extreme in that it would seriously impede the minority protection the APR can provide.
Although Congress did not follow the recommendation of the Commission, the Commission’s
concerns were reflected in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978204 as the codified APR was more
limited in scope than the common law rule.205 Since 1978 the statutory language of the APR in
Chapter 11 is largely unchanged.206
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In the 1990s the National Bankruptcy Review Commission (NBRC) recommended
amending the Code to provide for the purchase of a reorganized debtor by “members of a junior
class of claims or interests” without violating the APR.207 This proposal facilitates the sale of a
business to equity holders or to creditors that would otherwise violate the APR. However, this
proposal does not go far enough. It did not address the application of the APR to settlements or
financing associated with first-day orders and roll-ups – other rescue tools.
More recently the ABI proposed a modification of the APR in Chapter 11.208 The proposal
provided that a plan can be confirmed over the objection of an immediately junior class provided
that class received “not less than the redemption option value.”209 Moreover, a plan may be
confirmed over the objection of a senior class that is not paid in full provided the “deviation from
the absolute priority rule treatment of the senior class is solely for the distribution to an
immediately junior class of the redemption option value.”210 The heart of the proposal is the
redemption option value that attempts “to capture the total enterprise value of the firm,” which the
ABI recognized was complex.211 It would interject another layer of complexity in the Chapter 11
process in determining the value of the hypothetical option to purchase the debtor for a three year
redemption period following the petition date based on the full amount of the senior class claims,
with fees, expenses and interest.212 In light of the complexity the proposal has not garnered much
interest.213 Beyond the problem of complexity, the proposal would not resolve the issues arising
under the cascading effect of Jevic on other rescue tools.
The ABI proposal is based on, at least in part, the concept of relative priority,214 rather than
absolute priority.215 Under relative priority the senior creditors receive the equity of the
reorganized debtor and junior creditors receive a call option valued at the amount owed to the
senior creditors.216 With relative priority the bankruptcy court only needs to know the amount
owed to the senior creditors and the date to exercise the option.217 Advocates view relative priority
as simple to implement and avoids the need to know the value of the firm218 at the time of
confirmation of a plan.219 However, as with the ABI proposal, the determination of the option
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price may be complicated and costly.220 The benefits of not having to value the firm as in a typical
APR analysis may be lost as relative priority may, in some cases, be costly and application of the
APR simpler to implement.221 Moreover, as with the ABI proposal, the proposal would not
directly address problems associated with the cascading effect of the APR in contexts outside of a
reorganization plan.
In late 2018 the Small Business Reorganization Act222 was introduced into Congress223
which would add a new subchapter to Chapter 11 applicable to small business debtors 224 which
would modify the APR. The bill did not gain much legislative traction, but in 2019 the Small
Business Reorganization Act (SBRA) was re-introduced and quickly passed by both the House
and the Senate, and was signed into law in August of 2019.225 The SBRA makes the APR generally
inapplicable to small business debtors226 and replaces it with a new framework to effectuate a
cross-class cram down. Under the SBRA a small business debtor can obtain confirmation over an
objecting class of secured creditors as long as the plan provides that the secured creditor retain
their lien, received payment equal to value of claim or indubitable equivalent.227 Confirmation of
an objecting class of unsecured claimholders is available if the plan offers all disposable income
of the debtor over a 3 to 5 year period.228 If these requirements are met, the owners of the business
can retain their ownership interest without paying senor interests in full.229
This reform is positive in that it will overcome the impediment the APR presents to owners
retaining an interest in a debtor post-confirmation in small business cases. However, the reform
is too narrow. It does not expressly provide for the sale to other junior classes of claims or interests
and the reform would not curtail the cascading effect of Jevic on other rescue tools. Additionally,
it does not apply to all business debtors. It applies to a small business debtor – a debtor with
approximately $2.7 million in debt.230 The problems with the APR231 are not limited to small
business debtors, but apply to large debtors as well.
While the SBRA reform of the APR is too limited, it is also too broad. The SBRA
eliminates the APR as to unsecured claimholders. The APR does not serve as a baseline to work
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from under the SBRA. The protections the APR can provide, even if just as a baseline to work
from, are eliminated. Thus, the SBRA reform of the APR in this sense is too broad.
VI.

Proposed U.K. Reform: Lessons for U.S. Reform

Each of the U.S. proposals described above are flawed in that they do not fully address the
traditional difficulties associated with the APR and the problems stemming from Jevic. Some
reforms are too broad and others are not broad enough. However, recent reform efforts in the U.K.
can provide inspiration to U.S policymakers on how to amend the APR. Simple transplantation of
U.K. reforms is not suggested, but rather examining the reform proposal for particular aspects of
the reform that can be employed to enhance Chapter 11 and help make it more effective in
promoting rescue.232 A comparative approach to developing a reform can provide ideas on how
to improve the policy being examined.233 The context of the reform which will be drawn from and
the context in which it will be incorporated in are important considerations.234 Merely drawing
one legal rule from a regime and incorporating it to another, without consideration of the context
can be problematic.235
Although, at first blush, the context of the U.K. insolvency regime appears different than
the context of Chapter 11 in the U.S., the difference is not very stark and, in fact the two regimes
are converging. Chapter 11 is traditionally a debtor-oriented model and was passed at a time with
a fragmented banking environment in which there was no meaningful opposition to the debtorfriendly Chapter 11 process.236 Generally, U.K. insolvency law has been at the other end of the
spectrum with a concentrated and strong banking system resulting with strong secured creditor
control in insolvency proceedings.237 Over time, however, there has been an increase in secured
creditor control in the U.S. in part to financing arrangements providing liens over virtually all of a
debtor’s assets.238 This has led to increased secured creditor control in Chapter 11 away from a
debtor-friendly orientation.239 At the same time U.K. policymakers have been working to reduce
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the secured creditor control orientation, but have not been largely successful.240 Both regimes
have, in general, a strong secured creditor orientation.
Additionally, the economic nature of companies in both jurisdictions have changed in
similar ways over the years. The service sector has grown in both the U.S. and U.K. with
companies having few hard assets.241 In both jurisdictions the cash flow value of the firm is more
important than hard assets, and keeping employees in tact more important than in the past.242
In light of this convergence in terms of secured creditor control and economic nature of the
firm in both jurisdictions, 243 it is appropriate for the U.S. to look to the U.K. for ideas and possible
avenues for reform. The reform suggested is limited and not a “transplanting” of one legal rule
from one jurisdiction to another without a consideration context. The proposed reform selects only
one aspect of the U.K. reform that if incorporated in Chapter 11 can help facilitate enhancing broad
orientation of rescue advanced herein.
A. U.K. Proposed Reform
The U.K. reform proposal for a new standalone restructuring mechanism is the product of
the Insolvency Service’s consultation published in May 2016 which explored options for
reforming the insolvency framework.244 In September 2016 the Insolvency Service published a
summary of responses245 and then in August 2018 the Insolvency Service published the
government response detailing the proposed new standalone restructuring mechanism.246 The
most germane aspects of the proposed standalone restructuring mechanism to this article are the
cross-class cram down and the APR.247
Under the proposed standalone248 restructuring mechanism, cross-class cram down of
secured and unsecured creditors will be permitted249 provided certain safeguards250 for the
protection of creditors are in place.251 A vital aspect of protection is the role envisioned for the
courts throughout the process,252 which is similar to the process for schemes of arrangement.253
The proposal includes requirements pertaining to class formation254 and voting threshold
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requirements,255 which provide some protection. The protection these afford is manifest in the
requirement that the court have a hearing to examine the classes proposed, with parties ability to
object to the class formation, and the requirement that the court confirm that the proposal can be
voted on.256 Following the vote the court will hold a second hearing to consider confirmation of
the proposed plan.257 The court will have “absolute discretion” to confirm the plan or not and there
will be a right to appeal if the plan is confirmed.258
Another important protection included in the proposed reform for a dissenting creditor
class is the requirement “that a dissenting class of creditors must be satisfied in full before a more
junior class may receive any distribution or keep any interest under the restructuring plan[,]”259
i.e., the APR. In light of the criticisms of the APR such as inflexibility,260 impediment to effective
reorganization261 and potential for abuse by some at the expense of others,262 the Government
added flexibility for a court to deviate from a strict application of the rule.263 Under the proposal
a court may confirm a plan that does not comply with the APR “where noncompliance is: [1]
necessary to achieve the aims of the restructuring; and [2] just and equitable in the
circumstances.”264
This injection of flexibility into application of the APR, at first blush, appears to infringe
upon the protection the rule is designed to provide to creditors. However, the test to deviate from
the APR is a high threshold that is premised on the baseline standard for confirmation - compliance
with the APR.265 To deviate from that baseline standard, the deviation must be vital to “an
effective and workable restructuring plan” and sanctioned by the court.266 As with the class
formation and voting requirements, it is the integral role of the court in approving such a deviation
that provides protection to creditors when there is noncompliance with the APR.
Important in any discussion of the APR is the basis for valuation employed in the analysis
to determine compliance with the rule.267 A detailed analysis of valuation in this context is
complex268 and well beyond the ambit of this article.269 However, the Government considered the
issue and after consultation determined that the “next best alternative for creditors” rather than a
“minimum liquidation value” should be the value employed in a cross-class cram down
scenario.270 This approach is flexible, but will require courts to decide valuation if there is a
challenge to the value employed.271 As with other aspects of the proposed reform, courts will be
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central to the process, and in the case of the proposed valuation standard there may be an increase
in litigation and a burden on the courts.272
B. Lessons for the U.S. Reform
The new U.K. standalone restructuring mechanism has many similarities to Chapter 11 in
its current form. Similar to the U.K. reform proposal, Chapter 11 provides for a cross-class cram
down273 and has certain protections for minority creditors and interests through rules pertaining to
class composition of claims or interests274 and voting.275
Just as in the U.K. proposal, the bankruptcy court plays an integral role in the Chapter 11
process.276 The bankruptcy court will typically hold a hearing to consider approval of a disclosure
statement ensuring it has adequate information,277 prior to the solicitation of votes from creditors
or interest holders.278 After voting, the bankruptcy court will hold a second hearing,279 at which
parties may object,280 to consider confirmation of the plan.281 If the plan is confirmed parties can
appeal the order of confirmation.282
Comparable with the U.K. proposal Chapter 11 has the APR283 which comes into play
when the plan that is up for confirmation has a dissenting class. Section 1129(b)(1) provides that
if there is a dissenting class the court “shall confirm the plan . . . if the plan . . . is fair and
equitable[,]”284 i.e., complies with the APR. Under Chapter 11 there is no statutory discretion to
deviate from the APR.285 Importantly, Jevic reinforced the statutorily mandated lack of discretion
bankruptcy courts have to deviate from the APR in confirming a plan to structured dismissals 286
and likely has a cascading impact on other rescue tools that infringe upon the APR.287
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However, English courts under the U.K. proposal will have discretion to deviate from a
strict application of the APR in confirming a restructuring plan.288 The U.S. should amend §
1129(b) to statutorily provide discretion to bankruptcy courts to deviate from the APR. The
requirements of § 1129(b)(1) and (2) - the “fair and equitable” requirement and the definition
thereof - should not be modified and would serve as the baseline for a cram down, just as in the
U.K. proposal.289 Discretion for the bankruptcy court to deviate from this baseline standard should
incorporated into the statutory framework.
In crafting a statutory solution, the standard in the U.K. proposed restructuring mechanism,
as well as prior U.S. case law, can serve as guides. English courts will have discretion to deviate
from the APR if it is “necessary to achieve the aims of the restructuring; and just and equitable in
the circumstances.”290 Bankruptcy courts have deviated from the APR when there are “significant
Code-related objectives”291 or a “significant offsetting bankruptcy-related justification.”292 Section
1129(b)293 should be amended to add a new subsection (3) that provides as follows:
(3) The court may confirm a plan that is not fair and
equitable, as defined in subsection (b)(2), if such is:
(A) necessary to achieve a significant offsetting
Chapter 11-related objective; and
(B) just and equitable in the circumstances.
This suggested reform may appear radical in light of the well-entrenched position of the
APR.
However, the reality is that many bankruptcy courts already ignore the APR.295 This
leads to litigation with disparate results from court to court and varying degrees of protection
afforded to minority interests by the APR.296 This reform proposal will set a statutory standard to
guide bankruptcy courts. Granted the litigation will not end, but the statutory standard will provide
a framework for courts to apply, rather than inconsistent judicially created deviations from the
APR.297
This reform proposal is not as radical as other possible reforms. For example, the SBRA
abolishes the APR as to unsecured claimholders and replaces it with the requirement of the plan
294
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provided projected disposable income over 3 to 5 years.298 There is no baseline application of the
APR that can be deviated from upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence as with the
proposed reform herein. The elimination of the APR as to unsecured claimholders under the SBRA
is a much greater deviation from the current application of the APR than the proposed reform.
With that said, the SBRA would, at least in the small business cases within the scope of the SBRA,
reduce the cascading effect of Jevic. With the elimination of the APR, there would not be a
principle of absolute priority to apply in non-confirmation of plan contexts.
The “redemption option value” reform proposed by the ABI, which is rooted in the concept
of relative priority, is much more complex299 than the reform proposed. The ABI reform would
add sophisticated valuation methods to determine the value of the firm for the option. This
cumbersome approach would lead to greater costs and delay, which may impede rescue.
Importantly, the ABI reform or a relative priority scheme would not address the problem posed by
a cascading effect of Jevic. The normative principle of absolute priority would still be applicable
in non-confirmation of plan contexts.300
Arguably, the most serious problem of such a proposal is that the minority protection
provided by the APR will be diminished. The concern is that the proposed reform will impede the
fairness for the minority interests. Fairness can be thought about in terms of fairness in the process
and fairness in the outcome.301 The proposed reform is fair in terms of process. Fairness in process
includes dimensions such as ensuring voices being heard in the process and reducing partiality in
the system.302 The proposed reform maintains the integrity the current procedural safeguards in
place including classification of claims into substantially similar classes, voting rights and
requirements, hearings on a disclosure statement and plan with the right to object, as well as the
right to appeal an adverse confirmation order.303 Thus, the minority interests will continue to have
a voice in the process.
Importantly the fairness in process is ensured with the integral role the bankruptcy court
plays in the application of the new reform allowing deviation from the APR. The ultimate decision
to permit a deviation from the APR is in the discretion of the bankruptcy judge and requires a
“significant offsetting Chapter 11- related objective” to warrant the departure from the APR. The
ability of a debtor or a secured creditor to control the outcome in the process of plan confirmation
and application of the APR will be scrutinized by and need approval by the bankruptcy judge. This
promotes impartiality in the process and fairness across all stakeholders in the case.
Giving bankruptcy judges this type of discretion may give some, particularly those in the
proceduralist camp,304 cause for pause. The proceduralist views the role of the bankruptcy judge
as limited to primarily adjudicating “disputes about the creditors’ relative entitlements.”305 This
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viewpoint is closely aligned with creditors’ bargain theory. Discretion proposed in the application
with the APR would likely run counter to those on this side of the normative debate because the
focus should be on the relative entitlements focusing on priority. One would expect the discretion
proposed would be more closely aligned with those in the traditionalist camp306 – i.e. the
progressives. The progressives likely would view this discretion consistent with the need to
advance a wide array of interests and stakeholders, rather than the focus solely on creditor interests.
The reality is that bankruptcy judges play a large role in the Chapter 11 process307 and
already have a great deal of discretion. For example, bankruptcy judges exercise discretion to
permit priority-violating distributions in various rescue tools with an eye toward rescue. 308 They
are not merely an umpire but have an active role all along the way in a Chapter 11 case.309 The
role the bankruptcy court plays is vital to protecting minority interests, just as it is in the English
law and in the proposed reform.310 This discretion, just as with English judges in the proposed
restructuring mechanism,311 will give bankruptcy courts the ability to balance the interests of
various stakeholders’ interests and provide protection for minority stakeholders.312 And,
importantly, the standard begins with the APR as a baseline and requires a showing of a
“significant offsetting Chapter 11-related objective” to deviate from the APR. This standard helps
balance the playing field between those in the proceduralist and traditionalist camps.
The proposed reform not only maintains fairness in the process, but the outcome is also
fair in that it considers all stakeholders and interests. The bankruptcy court ability to balance the
interests and deviate from the APR will enhance all stakeholders’ interest in the aggregate, not just
the debtor or particular creditors. No longer will the APR serve as a rigid barrier to confirmation
of a plan. Nor will the potential cascading effect of Jevic serve as a rigid barrier to employing
other rescue tools. The bankruptcy court will be able to exercise discretion in limited
circumstances to deviate from the APR to achieve “a significant offsetting Chapter 11-related
objective” if it is “just and equitable.” The bankruptcy court will no longer be blindly tethered to
the APR. The bankruptcy court can break away from the APR when necessary with an eye toward
rescue.313
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VII.

Conclusion

The Chapter 11 statutory framework and underling statutory policy rationale of Chapter 11
with an emphasis on fostering reorganization of a company has not materially changed since 1978.
However, Chapter 11 practice has changed and evolved to foster not only the reorganization or
rescue of a company, but rescue of the business as well. This broader orientation of Chapter 11 is
seen in rescue tools, such as § 363 sales, that facilitate a rescue that is broader than rescue of the
company. In light of this broader conception of rescue and the role of Chapter 11, the rigid
adherence to the APR as codified in 1978, as seen in Jevic, is antiquated. This is particularly true
when the cascading effect of Jevic on the use of Chapter 11 rescue tools is considered.
The U.K. in drawing on Chapter 11 has proposed an APR that is flexible and compatible
with a restructuring regime that embraces a broad conceptualization of rescue. U.S. policymakers
should take lessons from the U.K. and reform the APR to reflect modern Chapter 11 in practice.
Modern Chapter 11 practice and its rescue tools reflect an insolvency regime that is dynamic. The
Code and the courts rigid adherence to the APR reflects an insolvency regime that is static.314
Policymakers must infuse flexibility into the APR to ensure that the Chapter 11’s law on the books
is as dynamic as modern Chapter 11 practice and its rescue tools. This is necessary for Chapter
11 to fully foster a broad conceptualization of rescue that includes rescue of the company, as well
as rescue of the business.

Secondly, the U.S. should look to the proposed valuation standard in the U.K. restructuring mechanism to see if
any lessons can be derived from it to improve the valuation approach in the U.S. The U.S approach to valuation is
complex and it has been suggested that it may be time for reform. See Paterson, Market supra note 1, at 802-03;
Paterson, Reflections, supra note 13, at 490 (noting that some U.S. practitioners have argued reforming the valuation
method).
314
Professor Sharp recognized this philosophical divide in the application of the confirmation of a plan
requirements, including the APR. See Sharp, supra note 62, at 543-44. One viewpoint holds that the confirmation
standards are static and limited by the Code. Id. The other viewpoint embraces a dynamic view of the confirmation
standards in the Code in which the standards are the guiding principles. Id.
29

